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Abstract
While attracting attention is one of the prime goals of content providers, the
conversion of that attention into revenue is by no means obvious. Given that
most users expect to consume web content for free, a provider with an estab-
lished audience faces a dilemma. Since the introduction of advertisements or
subscription fees will be construed by users as an inconvenience which may lead
them to stop using the site, what should the provider do in order to maximize
revenues? We address this question through the lens of adaptation theory,
which states that even though a change affects a person’s utility initially, as
time goes on people tend to adapt and become less aware of past changes. We
establish that if the likelihood of continuing to attend to the provider after
an increase in inconvenience is log-concave in the magnitude of the increase,
then the provider faces a tradeoff between achieving a higher revenue per user
sooner and maximizing the number of users in the long term. On the other
hand, if the likelihood of continuing to attend to the provider after an increase
in inconvenience is log-convex, then it is always optimal for the provider to
perform the increase in one step.
1 Introduction
While the explosion of content offered by the web constitutes a bonanza for
consumers, the same cannot be said of the content providers. From the early
days of the web, keen competition for the attention of users [9, 13, 14] dictated
that providers offer both access and consumption for free. As a result, most
users expect not only to easily access any kind of content, but to consume it
at no cost; an expectation that is embodied by the “information wants to be
free” manifesto [5].
The goal of content providers is to turn attention to their sites into rev-
enues that will at least offset their costs. However, even providers with estab-
lished audiences often struggle to convert the attention they receive into profits
(e.g., [1]). There are many ways of converting attention to revenue; charging
subscription rates and presenting adverts are typical examples. Mixed strate-
gies, where subscription fees and advertising are combined, have also been con-
sidered [4, 19, 17]. But all these strategies carry a price, for while some users
perceive the associated costs as an inconvenience to be tolerated in exchange
for the value obtained, others see them as a nuisance that makes them leave
the site. This issue has been especially acute with the advent of increasingly
intrusive “rich media” online advertising formats [12].
Given that a provider can increase his revenue by imposing some inconve-
nience to users while risking losing some of the attention paid to his content,
how steeply and for how long should he increase this inconvenience in order to
maximize revenue? We address this question through the lens of adaptation
theory, which states that even though a change affects a person’s happiness in
the short term, in the course of time people tend to adapt and become less
aware of past changes [10, 11]. Furthermore, as a number of empirical stud-
ies show, gradual changes and spikes in utility have rather different effects on
adaptation levels: whereas sudden changes are noticed and evaluated, a very
slow gradual change will drag the adaptation level along with it and at times
may not even be detected [15].
We treat the dynamics of the adaptation process in settings where multiple
changes in the utility to the user occur over time. Intuitively, if the rate at
which changes are introduced is much smaller than the rate at which people
adapt to changes, then users will adapt over time and continue to give their
attention to the site. On the other hand, if the rate at which inconveniences
are introduced is much higher than the rate at which people adapt, then users
will leave the site. The interesting and challenging regime is the one where
the two rates have the same order of magnitude, and as a result, some people
are able to adapt while some cannot. In this case the provider may face a
tradeoff between achieving a higher revenue per user sooner and maximizing
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the number of users in the long term.
Our analysis is based on the probability that a user continues to attend to
the provider after an increase in inconvenience as a function of the magnitude
of the increase; a function that can be measured in real settings (e.g., with A/B
testing). The shape of this function characterizes the strategy that maximizes
the provider’s revenue. We find that if the likelihood of continuing to attend to
the provider after an increase in inconvenience is log-convex (i.e., the logarithm
of the function is convex), then it is always optimal for the provider to perform
the increase in one step.
On the other hand, if the likelihood of continuing to attend to the provider
after an increase in inconvenience is log-concave in the magnitude of the in-
crease, then the provider faces a tradeoff between achieving a higher revenue
per user sooner and maximizing the number of users in the long term. More-
over, in the case of a fixed target level of inconvenience, the long-term number
of users is a decreasing function of the average rate of increase in inconvenience.
We provide an algorithm for solving the revenue maximization problem of the
provider.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we review literature on
maximizing the revenue of a content provider. Section 3 introduces the model.
Sections 4, 5, 6, and 7 assume a fixed target increase in inconvenience and
study monotonicity properties of the fraction of users that stay after the whole
amount of inconvenience is introduced. Section 4 considers a setting where
users completely adapt to changes and the time to adapt is independent of the
magnitude of the change; two assumptions that we relax in the following sec-
tions. Section 5 studies adaptation in the presence of discontinuous behavior.
Section 6 assumes that the time to adapt depends on the magnitude of the
change. Section 7 considers lasting effects, that is, settings where users do not
completely adapt to changes. Then, in Section 8 we consider the provider’s
revenue optimization, where both the inconvenience increase per period and
the total increase in inconvenience are chosen optimally. Section 9 concludes.
All the proofs are provided in the Appendix.
2 Related Literature
Advertisements and subscription fees are the main sources of revenue for most
content providers. A number of studies have considered their optimal levels
both separately and jointly. Dewan et al. use optimal control to balance the
amount of advertising and content on a web page [8]. Kumar and Sethi extend
the optimal control model to also include subscription fees [17]. Prasad et
al. suggest that websites can increase their revenues by offering a menu of
2
contracts, where high subscription fees are associated with a small number
of ads and vice versa [19]. Baye and Morgan present a model that explains
why traditional and modern mass media — such as television, newspapers,
magazines, and Internet sites — typically derive the bulk of their revenues
from advertisements rather than subscriptions [4]. Godes et al. explore the
implications of two-sided competition for the sale of content to consumers
and the attraction of advertisers on the actions and source of profits of media
firms [12].
Even though some of the aforementioned papers consider the effect of in-
convenience on the number of users (e.g., [12, 17]), they do not consider the
effects of adaptation. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper to
consider adaptation in the context of a content provider’s revenue. Adapta-
tion theory allows us to consider how users react over time to an introduced
inconvenience. In this paper, we consider a general framework that applies to
any type of inconvenience to the user that generates revenue for the provider.
Subscription fees and advertisements are typical examples.
3 The Model
In this section we discuss our modeling assumptions with respect to the users
and the providers.
3.1 Users
Throughout the paper, we denote by p(x) the probability that a user continues
using the site after the inconvenience level (e.g., advertisement level, subscrip-
tion cost) is increased by x. This probability captures heterogeneity in the
user population: some users may be more likely to stay than others, and a
user chosen at random stays with probability p(x).
We assume that p(0) = 1, i.e., all users continue to use the site if there is
no change. Moreover, p(x) is a decreasing function of x: the larger the increase
in inconvenience, the smaller the probability of continuing to use the site.
We next describe a utility model that gives rise to such a probability p(x).
Nevertheless, many of our results are stated in terms of p(x) and hold even if
this utility model does not apply.
3.1.1 Additive Random Utility Model
We consider the user’s experienced utility, that is, the hedonic experience as-
sociated with the use of a website (see [16]). Let u0 be the user’s current level
of utility from using the website, and assume that he gets zero utility from not
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using a website. We further assume that u0 > 0, so that the user is initially
better off using the site.
We assume that if the inconvenience that a user experiences at the website
increases by a strictly positive amount x, then the user incurs a cost of c(x)+Y ,
where c(x) is an increasing function of x and Y is a random term drawn from
a distribution whose cumulative distribution function is given by F . Thus, the
user continues to use the website after the undesired change with probability
p(x) = P[u0 − (c(x) + Y ) > 0] = P[Y < u0 − c(x)] = F (u0 − c(x)).
This Additive Random Utility Model (ARUM)1 and the assumption that
p(0) = 1 imply that
p(x) =
{
F (u0 − c(x)) if x > 0,
1 if x = 0.
We note that a p(x) that arises from this ARUM is decreasing in x, because
c(x) is an increasing function of x and thus F (u0−c(x)) is a decreasing function
of x.
We also point out that for any decreasing function p(x) on [0,∞) such that
p(0) = 1 and p(x) ≥ 0, one can construct a utility model that generates it. For
example, this can be achieved by setting u0 = 1, c(x) = x, and F (y) = p(1−y)
for y ≤ 1.
3.1.2 Adaptation
According to adaptation theory, even though a change initially affects a per-
son’s happiness, as time goes on people tend to adapt and become less aware of
past changes. In the context of our theory, an increase in inconvenience by an
amount x initially decreases a user’s utility by c(x) + Y ; and we assume that
as time goes by and if no additional inconvenience is experienced, the user’s
experienced utility gradually increases. The user’s utility may either increase
up to u0 — complete adaptation — or up to some smaller value u0, which
signals the existence of lasting effects.
In terms of the probability p(x), if there is complete adaptation and a
sufficient amount of time has elapsed since the last increase in inconvenience,
then a current user will stay with probability p(x) if inconvenience is increased
by x. The probability of staying will be smaller in the case of incomplete
adaptation. The latter is modeled in Section 7.
1We note that ARUMs are often used in economics, see e.g., [6].
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3.2 Provider
In the first part of the paper (Sections 4, 5, 6, and 7) we assume that the
provider wishes to increase the inconvenience that users experience by some
fixed amount A, and study monotonicity properties of the fraction of users
that stay after the total increase A is introduced. There are of course many
ways whereby the target inconvenience level can be reached. For example, it
may be reached through a single increase of A, through two increases of A/2,
or through ten increases of A/10.
We note that A is the increase in inconvenience, which in general may
be different from the target inconvenience level. Thus, if users currently do
not experience any inconvenience, then A is the target inconvenience level.
Otherwise, if users are already experiencing some inconvenience (say A0), then
the target inconvenience level is A0 + A.
In Section 8, we consider the provider’s revenue optimization, where both
A and the number of increases through which it is introduced are chosen opti-
mally. The provider wishes to maximize his revenue, which at any given point
in time is an increasing function of both the number of users and the cur-
rent inconvenience level. Furthermore, we assume that the providers discounts
future payments in that he prefers to get revenue sooner than later.
Key notation introduced in this and subsequent sections is summarized in
Table 1.
4 Fraction of Users that Stay
In this section, we study monotonicity properties of the fraction of users that
stay after A/x increases in inconvenience of magnitude x in a simple setting,
and in the following sections we discuss under what conditions the result can
be generalized.
In this section, we assume that users completely adapt to changes and take
the same time to adapt to an increase in inconvenience, independently of the
magnitude of the change. This assumption will be relaxed in the following
sections. We will refer to this adaptation time as “one period.”
The provider can then introduce the inconvenience A in the following way.
First, increase the inconvenience level by some amount x. Some users will
stop using the website because of this inconvenience, but some will stay. The
ones that stay will completely adapt to the change in one period. Once all
remaining users have adapted, the provider can further increase inconvenience
by x; again, some users will leave, but the ones that stay will adapt one period
later. If the provider repeats this A/x times, the target inconvenience A will
be reached, and the expected fraction of users that are still using the website
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Notation Definition Introduced in
p(x) probability a user leaves the website when inconve-
nience level is increased by x
Section 3.1
u0 user’s initial utility from using the website Section 3.1.1
c(x) + Y immediate disutility after an increase in inconve-
nience by x
Section 3.1.1
F cumulative distribution function of Y Section 3.1.1
A target increase in inconvenience Section 3.2
sA(x) expected fraction of users that use the website after
a total increase A is introduced in increments of x
Section 4
l(x) time to adapt completely to a change of magnitude
x
Section 6
tA(x) time to introduce a total increase A in increments
of x
Section 6
δ provider’s discount factor Section 8
r(x) provider’s revenue per user when the total inconve-
nience is x
Section 8
Π(x, z) provider’s infinite horizon revenue from introducing
inconvenience x is each of the next z periods
Section 8
Table 1: Notation used in the paper.
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Figure 1: Schematic utility evolution of a user that stays with the site when
the provider implements the change in two steps. The user stays because his
experienced utility never drops below 0.
is equal to2
sA(x) ≡ p(x)
A/x.
For example, assume that the provider implements the change in two steps.
Figure 1 illustrates the trajectory of a user’s utility that continues using the
website after both changes have been introduced. Initially, his utility is equal
to u0. When the first change of magnitude x is introduced, his utility decreases
by c(x) + y1, where y1 is the realization of Y after the first increase. In this
case, the disutility is smaller than u0, and thus the user does not leave. After
the change, the user’s utility gradually increases (or equivalently, his disutility
gradually decreases), and after one period his utility becomes u0. Then, a
second change of magnitude x is introduced, which in this example is the last
increase in inconvenience. Thus, after the user adapts to the second change,
his utility remains at u0. We do not make any assumption on the trajectory of
the utility between the time of the change and the time of complete adaptation.
The following lemma gives monotonicity properties of sA(x).
Lemma 1. For any A > 0:
(i) If p(x) is log-concave, then
2Because A/x is the number of increases, it needs to be an integer. Thus, the domain
of sA is {A/i : i ∈ N
+}. However, in our analysis we study monotonicity properties of sA
on [0, A]. Then, monotonicity properties follow for {A/i : i ∈ N+}. For instance, if sA is
increasing on [0, A], then it is also increasing in any subset. Note that sA(x) is well-defined
on [0, A] (as long as p(x) is defined).
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(a) sA(x) is decreasing in x and
(b) for any x1, x2, ..., xz ≥ 0, p
(∑z
j=1 xj
)
≤
∏z
j=1 p(xj).
(ii) If p(x) is log-convex, then
(a) sA(x) is increasing in x and
(b) for any x1, x2, ..., xz ≥ 0, p
(∑z
j=1 xj
)
≥
∏z
j=1 p(xj).
Lemma 1 shows that if p(x) is log-concave (resp. log-convex) then the
expected fraction of users that use the website after a total increase A is in-
troduced is increasing (resp. decreasing) in the number of changes. Condition
(a) states this directly in terms of sA(x), that is, assumes that all changes have
the same magnitude. On the other hand, condition (b) is comparing a setting
where changes of arbitrary magnitudes are introduced in separate periods with
the situation where a change equal to the magnitude of their sums is intro-
duced in one step. We note that Lemma 1 holds regardless of whether p(x)
becomes 0 at some finite x or p(x) > 0 for all x.
We next discuss the assumptions of log-concavity and log-convexity. Then,
in Section 4.2 we consider the implications of Lemma 1 and relate the result
to the ARUM.
4.1 Log-concave and log-convex functions
A function is log-concave if its logarithm is concave. All concave and linear
functions are log-concave, but there also exist convex functions that are log-
concave. In this setting, we are interested in whether the function p(x) is log-
concave. This is a decreasing function with p(0) = 1 and p(x) ≥ 0. Examples
of such functions that are log-concave are e−x
k
with k > 1 and (1−xk) · 1{x≤1}
with k > 1, where 1{·} is the indicator function.
A function is log-convex if its logarithm is strictly convex. Examples of
functions that are log-convex and satisfy the requirements of p(x) are 1/(1+x)k
with k > 0 and e−x
k
with k ∈ (0, 1).
If the function p(x) is differentiable, then log-concavity and log-convexity
of p(x) are related to the monotonicity of p′(x)/p(x). If the ratio p′(x)/p(x) is
decreasing (increasing) then p(x) is log-concave (log-convex).
4.2 Implications of Lemma 1
We now consider the implications of Lemma 1 for the provider’s dilemma.
If p(x) is log-concave, we have the following effects:
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Figure 2: A log-concave and a log-convex function for the probability of staying
after a change of magnitude x. For small changes, more people stay under the
log-concave function; for large changes, more people stay under the log-convex
function.
• For a fixed total increase of inconvenience, the faster the final level is
reached, the more likely it is that a user leaves the site. Equivalently,
the smaller the number of changes (assuming that all changes have the
same magnitude), the more likely a user is to leave the website.
• A provider that wants to maximize his revenue by increasing some form
of inconvenience faces a tradeoff: increasing the inconvenience fast means
that he will get higher revenue sooner, but also implies that many existing
users will stop using the site.
On the other hand, if p(x) is log-convex, the provider does not face a
tradeoff. By increasing the inconvenience in one step, he maximizes the number
of users that stay and gets the revenue sooner.3
We can get some intuition for this result by comparing a log-concave and a
log-convex function. Consider Figure 2 which shows the log-concave function
e−x
2
and the log-convex function e−x
1/2
. We observe that for small changes,
more people stay under the log-concave function. On the other hand, for large
changes, more people stay under the log-convex function. This suggests that
under a log-concave function it is better to make many small changes, whereas
under a log-convex function it is better to make one large change.
How does log-convexity of p(x) relate to properties of c(x) and F (y) of
the Additive Random Utility Model? Straightforward calculations show the
3Proposition 4 in Section 8 shows that if p(x) is log-convex, it is optimal to do the increase
in one step for the optimal A. However, this does not hold if the target increase A is very
suboptimal.
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following lemma.
Lemma 2. If F is log-concave, F (u0− c(0)) = 1, and c(x) is linear or convex,
then p(x) is log-concave.
We emphasize that it is the distribution function that is assumed to be
log-concave in Lemma 2, and not the density function. In fact, if the density
function is log-concave, then the distribution function is also log-concave [3].
On the other hand, there exist distributions for which the distribution function
is log-concave, while the density function is not (one such example is the log-
normal distribution).
Most common distributions are log-concave [3] (e.g., uniform, normal, ex-
ponential, logistic, etc). However, the assumption F (u0 − c(0)) = 1 can only
be satisfied if the support is a subset of (−∞, u0 − c(0)]. A log-concave dis-
tribution with support (−∞,+∞) gives rise to a probability p(x) that is log-
concave on (0,∞) and discontinuous at 0; a property related to the “penny
gap” phenomenon. This case is considered in Section 5.
Furthermore, the analysis in this section has been based on the following
two assumptions:
(i) The time to adapt is independent of the magnitude of the change
(ii) Users adapt to changes completely
In Section 6, we consider a more general model of complete adaptation, where
the time to adapt is an increasing function of the magnitude of the change.
In Section 7, we consider a setting with lasting effects, where users do not
completely adapt to changes in finite time.
5 Discontinuous Behavior
In this section, we consider settings of discontinuous behavior: while a user
stays with probability 1 when there is no change, a strictly positive change
creates a non-negligible probability of leaving no matter how small the change
is. This can be modeled by assuming that the function p(x) is discontinuous
at 0; that is, p(0) = 1 and limx→0+ p(x) < 1.
In fact, in the ARUM model, if the noise Y is drawn from a distribu-
tion whose support includes the interval (a,∞) for some constant a, then
limx→0+ p(x) < 1. By definition, p(0) = 1, and thus we have a discontinuity
at zero. For illustration, Figure 3 shows p(x) for u0 = 1 and c(x) = x when
Y is drawn from the standard normal distribution. We observe that there is
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Figure 3: Plot of p(x) for x > 0 when Y ∼ N(0, 1) and c(x) = x. In this case,
limx→0+ p(x) < 1.
a discontinuity at 0, since p(0) = 1. We note that the gap p(0)− limx→0+ p(x)
decreases as u0 increases, but never becomes equal to 0.
4
We note that p(x) can be discontinuous at 0 and log-convex throughout
[0,∞). Then, according to Lemma 1, sA(x) is increasing in x. On the other
hand, p(x) cannot be discontinuous at 0 and log-concave throughout [0,∞).
The following proposition considers functions that are discontinuous at 0 and
log-concave on (0,∞). It is shown that the corresponding sA(x) is unimodal:
increasing for small values of x and decreasing for large values of x.
Proposition 1. If limx→0+ p(x) < p(0) ≡ 1, and p(x) is log-concave for x >
0, then there exists x¯ > 0 such that sA(x) is increasing for x ∈ (0, x¯) and
decreasing for x ∈ (x¯,∞).
Thus, when p(x) is log-concave and discontinuous at zero, then sA(x) is
not decreasing throughout its domain. In the extreme case, x¯ > A and thus
sA(x) is increasing in [0, A]. For instance, if A = 0.5 and p(x) = 0.5e
−x2, then
sA(x) is increasing in [0, A].
The discontinuous behavior considered in this section is related to discon-
tinuous behaviors in other settings, most notably, those involving a zero price.
There is considerable empirical evidence that decisions about free content and
products differ from those involving a price, however small. Specifically, the
benefits associated with free content are perceived to be higher than those
with even minimal cost, which implies that when confronted with free choices
benefit-cost analyses are not part of the decision process. Thus people are
much more likely to take a product that is given to them for free than to
choose something better at a very low price. This phenomenon, called the
4We can only have continuity at 0 if F (u0 − c(0)) = 1. This can only be the case if the
maximum point of the distribution’s support is finite and equal to u0− c(0) (see Lemma 2).
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Figure 4: The penny gap phenomenon. Observe the discontinuity in the de-
mand when the price is 0.
zero-price effect [20] or the penny gap [2, 7], has also been observed in the con-
text of information technology, where affordable content turns out to be much
harder to provide than free one [18]. Formally, the zero-price effect implies that
the demand is discontinuous at zero, as illustrated in Figure 4 [7]. We note,
however, that the setting considered is this section does not correspond to the
zero-price effect, since even if the inconvenience that is introduced consists
of a subscription cost for content that was initially free, our model assumes
discontinuous behavior every time that price increases (not only at the first
period when the price increases from zero to some positive amount).
6 Time to Adapt
The previous sections assumed that the time to adapt to any change is con-
stant and independent of the magnitude of the change. Here we relax this
assumption.
Let l(x) be the time it takes a user to completely adapt to a change of
magnitude x.5 We expect this to be a nondecreasing function: the greater the
5We remind the reader that according to our ARUM, the user incurs a cost of c(x) + Y
after an increase in inconvenience by x, where Y is a random variable. Thus, by denoting
the time to adapt by l(x), we are implicitly assuming that it does not depend on Y , which
may seem unrealistic. To address this, we can consider a more general model where the time
to adapt is l˜(x, y), where x is the magnitude of the change and y is the realization of the
random variable Y . Assuming that l˜ is increasing in y, we define lǫ(x) = l˜(x, F
−1(1 − ǫ))
for ǫ ≥ 0. If F has a finite support, then in time l0(x) every user will adapt to a change of
magnitude x, so we can set l(x) = l0(x). Otherwise, if F has an infinite support (or if F has
a finite support but l0(x) is very large), we can choose some ǫ > 0 and set l(x) = lǫ(x). In
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increase (i.e., x) the more time it takes to adapt. In the terminology of Section
4, l(x) is the duration of a period. Now the provider has to wait for a time
l(x) between any two consecutive increases in order to give users that continue
using the website enough time to adapt to the change. Thus, the total time it
takes for the website to make a total change A through A/x changes of size x
is
tA(x) ≡
(
A
x
− 1
)
l(x).
In the previous section we considered the special case where l(x) is constant
(and positive) for x > 0. We saw that the provider faces a tradeoff if p(x) is
log-concave: a smaller increase x per period implies that more users will adapt
and continue using the site, but it will take more time until the target level
of inconvenience is reached. We now generalize this result for a wider class of
functions l.
Proposition 2. If p(x) is log-concave, and
x · l′(x) < l(x) for x > 0, (1)
then
(i) Both sA(x) and tA(x) are decreasing in x.
(ii) The expected number of users after A/x increases of size x is a decreasing
function of the average rate of increase r¯, where r¯ ≡ A/tA(x).
We note that x · l′(x)/l(x) is the elasticity of l. Thus, (1) requires that the
time to adapt is inelastic in the change. The case that l is constant (considered
in Section 4) is a special case where the elasticity is equal to 0.
Proposition 2 says that if the probability of staying after a change is log-
concave in the magnitude of the change and the time to adapt to a change is
inelastic in the magnitude of the change, then
• The provider faces a tradeoff between achieving a higher revenue per user
sooner and maximizing the number of users in the long term.
• For a fixed target level of inconvenience, the long-term number of users
is a decreasing function of the average rate of increase.
this case, (1− ǫ)p(x) is a lower bound for the probability that a user stays; by replacing p(x)
by (1 − ǫ)p(x) we can perform a worse-case analysis. The provider could optimally choose
ǫ; however, this is beyond the scope of this paper.
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If p(x) is log-concave and l(x) is elastic, then the provider again faces a
tradeoff, but not with the monotonicity properties discussed above, since the
function tA(x) is not decreasing for all x > 0. On the other hand, if p(x) is
log-convex, then by selecting x = A (i.e., performing the change in one step)
both the expected fraction of long-term users (sA(x)) is maximized and the
time until the total time is minimized (because tA(A) = 0).
7 Incomplete Adaptation
Up to now we have assumed that users that stay after a change have adapted
completely by the time of the next change. As a result, after every change of
magnitude x, a user stays with probability p(x).
In this section, we consider the case of lasting effects. We assume that
users do not completely adapt after a change, and as a result the probability of
staying after a change may be a decreasing function of the total inconvenience
introduced thus far. To model this, let pi(x) be the probability that a user stays
when the i-th change of magnitude x is introduced (assuming that he stayed
after all previous changes). Under complete adaptation pi(x) is simply p(x),
that is, independent of i; under incomplete adaptation pi(x) will be decreasing
in i.
The probability that a user stays after the change of A is completed in
increments of x is
sA,ǫ(x) ≡
A/x∏
i=1
pi(x).
Note that sA,ǫ=0(x) = sA(x). Thus, we know from Lemma 1 that if p(x) is
log-concave, then sA,ǫ=0(x) is decreasing in x. This is the case of complete
adaptation.
We can model lasting effects either directly through the probability p(x)
or through the ARUM. These approaches are considered in parts (i) and (ii)
of the following proposition.
Proposition 3. Suppose that p(A/k) > 0 for some k ∈ N. Let d(·) be a
strictly increasing function such that d(0) = 0, and let ǫ > 0. If either of the
following hold:
(i) pi(x) ≡ p(x)− ǫ · d((i− 1)x)
(ii) The ARUM applies and once a user adapts to the i-th change of magni-
tude x his utility is equal to u0 − ǫ · d(i · x), and F (u0 − ǫ˜) < 1 for any
ǫ˜ > 0
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then there exist x1, x2 such that x1 < x2 and sA,ǫ(x1) < sA,ǫ(x2).
The function d represents how much the probability of staying is decreased
because of the total inconvenience that the user is currently experiencing. In
the ARUM case (case (ii)), this effect is caused from a permanent decrease in
the utility function. In particular, in the ARUM case, the function d represents
how much the user’s utility is permanently decreased because of the increases
in inconvenience. We are assuming that the decrease in the user’s utility is a
function of the inconvenience that the user is currently experiencing, that is,
the sum of all inconveniences introduced up to the present time. The constant
ǫ represents the magnitude of the lasting effect.
We have previously seen that under complete adaptation and log-concave
probabilities of staying, the long-term number of users satisfies a monotonicity
property: it is an increasing function of the number of periods it takes to
perform the change. (This is the context of Lemma 1.) Proposition 3 shows
that even a small lasting effect destroys this monotonicity. The reason is that
no matter how small the lasting effect is, it accumulates over a large number
of periods. As a result, the expected number of users decreases much more if
the change is performed through many small increases than if the change is
performed through a few increases of a larger magnitude.
8 Revenue Maximization
In all previous sections, we were assuming that the target increase in inconve-
nience A was fixed and studied monotonicity properties of sA(x), which is the
expected fraction of long-term users when A is introduced in increments of x.
In this section we consider the problem of maximizing the expected discounted
payoff of the provider over both x and A (or equivalently x and z ≡ A/x).
We denote the revenue per user from an inconvenience of x by r(x). We
assume that r(x) is an increasing function: the higher the inconvenience to the
user, the higher the revenue to the provider. If this were not true, the provider
would decrease the inconvenience to make both himself and the users better
off.
We assume that each user visits the website once every period. The provider
discounts future payments according to a discount factor δ. We further assume
that an increase in inconvenience is made only after users that continued using
the site after the previous increase have completely adapted.
If we assume that the magnitude of all increases is the same and that users
that stay adapt to changes in one period, then the provider needs to solve the
following problem:
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max
x≥0,z∈N+
Π(x, z) ≡
z−1∑
i=1
δi−1p(x)ir(x · i) +
δz−1
1− δ
p(x)zr(x · z)
In particular, Π(x, z) denotes the provider’s infinite horizon revenue from
introducing inconvenience x is each of the next z periods. After the i-th
increase, a user is still using the system with probability p(x)i and the provider
gets a revenue of r(x · i) per user in that period which he discounts by δi−1.
The problem of maximizing Π(x, z) is two-dimensional, since we wish to
choose both x and z optimally. In the following section we show that if p is
log-convex, then it is optimal to implement the change in one step (validating
the claim made in Section 4). Then, we show that for any p, the problem can
be reduced to a one-dimensional problem if r is log-concave.
8.1 Log-convex Probability of Staying
In this section we consider the case of a log-convex p(x). We have seen in
Lemma 1 that if p(x) is log-convex then sA(x) is increasing in x, which im-
plies that the long-term number of users is maximized when the increase is
performed faster. The following proposition shows that Π(x, z) is maximized
when the increase is performed in one step (i.e., z = 1). As a result, the
problem of maximizing Π(x, z) reduces to maximizing p(x) · r(x).
Proposition 4. Suppose p(x) is log-convex. Let x∗ ∈ argmaxx≥0{p(x) · r(x)}.
Then (x∗, 1) is a maximizer of Π(x, z).
The previous proposition shows that (x∗, 1) is always a maximizer of Π(x, z).
We note that if p(x)i · r(i · x) = p(x)z · r(z · x) for i = 1, 2, ..., z − 1 and
p(x)z = p(x · z), then there may exist other maximizers as well. However, this
is not the case if r is strictly log-convex.
We note that the proof of Proposition 4 can be extended to show that if xi
is the magnitude of the increase in period i, then to find the optimal solution
it suffices to maximize p(x) · r(x) and implement the increase in one period.
Proposition 4 shows that the optimal solution is very simple if p is log-
convex: the provider only needs to maximize p(x)·r(x) and perform the optimal
increase right away. However, we expect that the function p(x) will usually not
be log-convex. In particular, log-convexity is associated with a non-negligible
probability of staying when the magnitude of the inconvenience is very large,
which is often not the case. On the other hand, the fact that there are no
standard distribution functions that are log-convex implies that log-convexity
of p(x) is highly unlikely if p(x) comes from the ARUM.
Thus, even though in the case of log-convexity the provider’s optimal deci-
sion is straightforward, we expect that usually he will face a tradeoff between
16
maximizing the number of long-term users and minimizing the time. This
problem is studied in the following section.
8.2 Log-concave Revenue per User
In this section, we assume that r is log-concave. As mentioned in Section
4.1, the class of log-concave functions includes all concave and linear func-
tions. These are reasonable assumptions for a revenue function, because such
functions exhibit constant or decreasing marginal returns. Because of the gen-
erality of log-concavity, our results apply to a variety of situations. When the
inconvenience is generated by a subscription cost, then the revenue per user
is equal to the subscription fee itself, and thus r(x) = x. On the other hand,
when the inconvenience is because of advertising, then r(x) can model vari-
ous pricing schemes for online advertising (e.g., pricing per impression, pricing
per click, and pricing per acquisition). Moreover, the price-per-impression and
the price-per-click could either be exogenously defined or depend on the total
number of advertisements on the site.
We next show how for any fixed magnitude of inconvenience x we can find
the optimal number of times that an inconvenience of magnitude x should be
introduced. We denote this number by z∗(x).
Lemma 3. If r is log-concave, then for a fixed x, Π(x, z) is maximized at
z∗(x) = min
{
z ∈ N :
r(x · z)
r(x · (z + 1))
≥ p(x)
}
.
We can get some intuition for this result by considering that after the z-
th change is introduced, the provider gets r(x · z) from each user per period.
Increasing the inconvenience by x one more time will result in a revenue of
r(x · (z+1)) from each remaining user and each user will stay with probability
p(x). Thus the change is worthwhile if and only if r(x ·z) ≤ p(x) · r(x · (z+1)).
Because r is log-concave, the ratio r(x ·z)/r(x ·(z+1)) is increasing in z, which
implies that it is never profitable to increase z above z∗(x).
Lemma 3 reduces the problem of maximizing Π(x, z) to the one-dimensional
problem of maximizing Π(x, z∗(x)). Note that Lemma 3 does not make any
assumptions on p(x). It applies for any p(x), whether it is log-concave, log-
convex, or neither; discontinuous at 0; etc. However, since we already know
(from Proposition 4) how to maximize Π(x, z) when p(x) is log-convex, Lemma
3 will be useful when p(x) is not log-convex.
The following example applies Lemma 3 to maximize the provider’s revenue
for an instance of the problem.
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Figure 5: Π(x, z∗(x)) for Example 1. It is maximized at 0.195, which implies
that the revenue is maximized if the inconvenience increases z∗(0.195) = 26
times by an amount of 0.195
Example 1. Suppose δ = 0.9, p(x) = e−x
2
and r(x) = x. We plot Π(x, z∗(x))
in Figure 5. At the optimal solution (x, z) = (0.195, 26), that is, the revenue
is maximized if the inconvenience increases 26 times by an amount of 0.195.
Thus, if p(x) represents the probability of staying when the subscription fee is
increased by x dollars, then it is optimal to increase the subscription fee by
about $0.20 for a total of 26 times until reaching a final subscription fee of
approximately $5.20.
Lasting effects
Lemma 3 can be generalized to include lasting effects.
Lemma 4. Suppose that a user stays after the i-th increase of magnitude x
with probability p(x) − ǫ · (i − 1) · x. If r is log-concave, then for a fixed x,
Π(x, z) is maximized at
z∗(x; ǫ) = min
{
z ∈ N :
r(x · z)
r(x · (z + 1))
+ ǫ · d(z · x) ≥ p(x)
}
.
Note that for ǫ = 0 this is identical to Lemma 3. We observe that z∗(x; ǫ)
is non-increasing in ǫ for a fixed x.
9 Conclusion
This paper studies revenue maximization from the point of view of an estab-
lished content provider with an existing user base through the lens of adap-
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tation theory. The provider can increase revenues by imposing some incon-
venience to users while risking to lose some of the users. Our approach is
very general in that it can be applied for any revenue generating process that
imposes inconvenience to the users (e.g., advertisements, subscription fees).
Our analysis is based on the function p(x) that represents the probability
that a user stays after an increase in inconvenience of magnitude x. We provide
a utility model from which p(x) may arise; however, knowledge of the utility
model is not essential for applying the results. In particular, the provider can
directly use p(x) to find the optimal strategy that maximizes his revenue.
The provider can use A/B testing to estimate p(x). For a given value of
xi, the provider can impose this inconvenience to some users. The percentage
of these users that continue using the website is an estimate for p(xi). The
provider should only use a small percentage of users to estimate p(x). Once
the provider has a good estimate for p(x) through which he can compute the
optimal way to introduce the inconvenience, then the optimal inconvenience is
applied to all users. We note that p(x) can also be estimated from information
from past experience and surveys.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1: Let g(x) = log(p(x)). Since A is a constant, sA(x) has
the same monotonicity properties as
h(x) ≡ log((p(x))1/x) =
g(x)
x
.
We first show (i). If p(x) is log-concave, then g(x) is concave. Let x1 < x2.
Concavity of g implies that for any x2 > 0 and θ ∈ (0, 1)
g(θx2) ≥ (1− θ)g(0) + θg(x2).
Note that g(0) = 0, because p(0) = 1. Setting θ = x1/x2 implies that
g(x1)
x1
≥
g(x2)
x2
,
which shows that sA(x) is decreasing in x.
If log(p(x)) is concave, Jensen’s inequality implies that
log
(
p
(
1
z
z∑
j=1
xj
))
≤
1
z
z∑
j=1
log(p(xj)).
Moreover, concavity of log(p(x)) and the fact that log(p(0)) = 0 imply that
z log
(
p
(
1
z
z∑
j=1
xj
))
≤ log
(
p
(
z∑
j=1
xj
))
.
Combining the last two inequalities we get that
p
(
z∑
j=1
xj
)
≤
z∏
j=1
p(xj).
A similar argument shows (ii).
Proof of Proposition 1: Let g(x) = log(p(x)). By the assumptions of this
proposition, g is concave, g(0) = 0 and limx→0+ g(x) < 0. Let x¯ be such that
x·g(x¯)/x¯ is tangent to g(x). This is shown schematically in Figure 6. It suffices
to show that g(x)/x is increasing for x ∈ (0, x¯) and decreasing for x ∈ (x¯,∞),
because log(sA(x)) = Ag(x)/x.
Consider some x1 < x¯. We observe in Figure 6 that g(x1)/x1 is equal to the
cotangent of angle a. The angle increases as x1 increases (as long as x1 < x¯).
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Figure 6: The function g(x) ≡ log(p(x)) and its tangent at x¯. The cotangent
of the angle a is equal to g(x1)/x1.
Since the cotangent decreases in (0◦, 90◦), we conclude that if x1 < x2 < x¯
then g(x1)/x1 ≥ g(x2)/x2.
On the other hand, to see why sA(x) is decreasing in x for x > x¯, define
g˜(x) = x ·
g(x¯)
x¯
· 1{x<x¯} + g(x) · 1{x≥x¯}.
The function g˜ is concave in [0,∞) and g˜(0) = 0, so the same argument
as Lemma 1 shows that g˜(x)/x is decreasing in x. Because of the way we
defined g˜, g˜(x) = g(x) for x ≥ x¯. This implies that g(x)/x is decreasing for
x ∈ (x¯,∞).
Proof of Proposition 2: We first show that if x · l′(x) < l(x), then tA(x) is
decreasing.
t′A(x) = l
′(x)
(
A
x
− 1
)
− l(x)
A
x2
=
l(x)
x
(
x · l′(x)
l(x)
(
A
x
− 1
)
−
A
x
)
<
l(x)
x
((
A
x
− 1
)
−
A
x
)
< 0
Now part (i) follows from Lemma 1.
We next prove part (ii). Let
fA(x) ≡
A
tA(x)
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We have shown that tA is decreasing, which implies that fA is increasing. Thus,
the inverse f−1A is an increasing function. Since the average rate of increase r¯
is equal to fA(x), we conclude that the increase x satisfies x = f
−1
A (r¯). The
probability that a user continues using the website after A/x increases of x
is sA(x) ≡ p(x)
A/x, and as a function of r¯ it can be expressed as sA(f
−1
A (r¯)),
which by Lemma 1 is a decreasing function of r¯.
Proof of Proposition 3: We first show (i).
sA,ǫ(x) =
A/x∏
i=1
(p(x)− ǫ · d((i− 1)x)
≤
A/x∏
i=A/(2x)+1
(p(x)− ǫ · d((i− 1)x)
≤ (p(x)− ǫ · d(A/2))A/(2x)
≤ (1− ǫ · d(A/2))A/(2x)
Since 1 − ǫ · A/2 < 1, for any ǫ, δ > 0 there exists a x¯ > 0 such that
sA,ǫ(x) < δ for x ∈ (0, x¯). In particular, this is achieved for x¯(δ, ǫ) = A log(1−
ǫd(A/2))/ log(δ). The result follows by choosing some x2 with p(x2) > 0,
setting δ = p(x2) and x1 < min(x2, x¯(δ, ǫ)).
We now show (ii). We observe that if (ii) holds, then the probability that
a user stays after the i-th increase (given that he stayed after all previous
increases) is
pi(x) = P[Y < u0 − c(x)− ǫd((i− 1) · x)]
= F (u0 − c(x)− ǫd((i− 1) · x)).
Thus,
sA,ǫ(x) =
A/x∏
i=1
F (u0 − c(x)− ǫ · d((i− 1)x))
≤
A/x−1∏
i=A/(2x)
F (u0 − c(x)− ǫ · d((i− 1)x))
≤ (F (u0 − c(x)− ǫ · d(A/2)))
A/(2x)
→ 0 as x→ 0
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Since u0 − c(x) < 1, for any ǫ, δ > 0 there exists a x¯ > 0 such that sA,ǫ(x) < δ
for x ∈ (0, x¯). The result follows by choosing some x2 with p(x2) > 0, setting
δ = p(x2) and x1 < x¯(δ, ǫ).
Proof of Proposition 4: Suppose there exists an optimal solution (x, z)
with z > 1 that is strictly better than (x∗, 1). We will contradict this by
showing that either Π(x · z, 1) ≥ Π(x, z) or Π(x · z′, 1) > Π(x, z) for some
z′ < z. This will imply that there is a solution (x′, 1) that is at least as good
as (x, z), and thus Π(x∗, 1) ≥ Π(x′, 1) ≥ Π(x, z).
Since p(x) is log-convex and z > 1, we know (from Lemma 1) that p(x)1/x ≤
p(x · z)1/(x·z) which implies that
p(x)z ≤ p(x · z). (2)
First suppose that p(x)i ·r(i ·x) ≤ p(x)z ·r(z ·x) for i = 1, 2, ..., z−1. Then,
by (2) we have that p(x)i · r(i · x) ≤ p(x · z) · r(z · x) for i = 1, 2, ..., z. Thus,
in this case,
Π(x, z) =
z−1∑
i=1
δ(i−1)p(x)ir(ix) +
δ(z−1)
1− δ
p(x)zr(x · z)
≤
z−1∑
i=1
δ(i−1)p(x · z)r(x · z) +
δ(z−1)
1− δ
p(x · z)r(x · z)
=
1
1− δ
p(x · z)r(x · z)
= Π(x · z, 1)
Now suppose that p(x)i · r(i · x) > p(x)z · r(z · x) for some i < z. Let
z′ = min{i : i ∈ argmax{p(x)i · r(i · x)}}
Then,
Π(x, z) =
z−1∑
i=1
δ(i−1)p(x)ir(ix) +
δ(z−1)
1 − δ
p(x)zr(x · z)
<
z′−1∑
i=1
δ(i−1)p(x · z)r(x · z) +
δ(z
′−1)
1− δ
p(x)z
′
r(x · z′)
≤
1
1− δ
p(x · z′)r(x · z′)
= Π(x · z′, 1)
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Proof of Lemma 3:
Π(x, z + 1)− Π(x, z) =
z∑
i=1
δ(i−1)p(x)ir(ix) +
δz
1− δ
p(x)z+1r((z + 1) · x)−
z−1∑
i=1
δ(i−1)p(x)ir(ix)−
δz−1
1− δ
p(x)zr(z · x) =
δ(z−1)p(x)zr(zx)−
δz−1
1− δ
p(x)z(r(z · x)− δp(x)r((z + 1) · x)) =
δ(z−1)p(x)z(r(zx)−
1
1− δ
r(z · x) +
δ
1− δ
p(x)r((z + 1) · x)) =
δz
1− δ
p(x)z(p(x)r((z + 1) · x)− r(zx))
Thus, Π(z + 1, x) > Π(z, x) if p(x) > r(zx)/r((z + 1) · x), and Π(z + 1, x) <
Π(z, x) if p(x) < r(zx)/r((z + 1) · x). Moreover, since r is log-concave,
r(zx)/r((z + 1) · x) is increasing in z (for a fixed x). Thus, Π(z, x) is uni-
modal in z for a fixed x: it is increasing for z < z∗(x) and decreasing for
z > z∗(x). It is thus maximized at z∗(x).
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